I specialize in the philosophy of mind, with a particular emphasis on questions of philosophical psychology. Central to my work is the question, “how do beliefs cause action, and vice versa?”, which I approach from an interdisciplinary, empirically-informed, Jamesean perspective. Drawing from recent work in cognitive science, I argue that beliefs cause actions, actions cause beliefs, and a completed belief-action arc reinforces both our beliefs and our predispositions to act. I further argue that this relationship is mediated by our emotions, which influence our willingness to act on a belief in a specific case, and the social nature of belief-action pairings, which reinforce the connection between a belief and a subsequent action through our community’s reaction. Taken together, this provides a nuanced account of action that embraces work in cognitive science, moral psychology, and social epistemology.

I am passionate about bringing marginalized figures back into the philosophical conversation. The most important figure to my work so far is Mary Whiton Calkins, the first woman president of the American Philosophical and Psychological Associations. I hope to publish a manuscript about Calkins within the next five years.

Other interests include critical thinking, the nature of cognitive biases, and the intersection of ethics and moral psychology.